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CASES NOTED
CONFLICT OF LAWS - JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN BROUGHT ACROSS STATE LINES
In divorce proceedings, plaintiff father was awarded permanent custody
of children in Missouri where all the parties were then domiciled. The de-
fendant mother violated the custody decree and took the children into Iowa,
where the father brought a habeas corpus proceeding for the custody of the
children. Held, that the Iowa court had jurisdiction to determine any
change of circumstances and to award permanent custody to the mother.
Principles of the full faith and credit provision of the Constitution or of
comity did not apply. Helton v. Crawley, 41 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1950).
Full faith and credit does not bar jurisdiction to redetermine child cus-
tody since custody decrees are provisional in character and are always subject
to revision.' A change of circumstances creates a new case which any equity
court can adjudicate,2 and only those facts brought before the court at the
time the original decree was rendered are res judicata and conclusive.3
The essential question is whether jurisdiction should be exercised. There
is a conflict as to whether domicile or residence-in-fact is the jurisdictional
requirement where a custody decree of a sister state is sought to be modified.
According to the residence-in-fact view, when children have been
brought across state lines in violation of a custody decree, jurisdiction has
been acquired because of the child's actual presence within the borders of
the state.4 Under the theory of parens patraie the courts can then make a
determination of the custody question.5 The need for establishing the fact
of the child's domicile within the state is considered to be immaterialY6
Other courts, although in full accord with the parens patraie theory,
hold that permanent custody can be awarded only when the requirement of
1. Barnett v. Blakley, 202 Iowa 1, 209 N.W. 412 (1926); In re Leate, 205 Mo.
App. 225, 223 S.W. 962 (1920); Stafford v. Stafford, 299 Iii. 438, 132 N.E. 452 (1921).
See 41 L.R.A. (n.s.) 564, 603 (1913).
2. Beale, The Status of the Child and Conflict of Laws, 1 U. or Cm. L. REV. 13
(1933).
3. N.Y. v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac.
606 (1930); Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 Pac. 918 (1914). But see Foster v.
Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 723, 68 P.2d 719, 723 (1937) (where the court said that even
change of circumstances is not required for a custody decree to be modified.)
4. Langan v. Langan, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 189, 150 F.2d 979 (1945); see Mollring
v. Mollring, 184 Iowa 464, 471, 472, 167 N.W. 524, 527 (1918); Re Matter of Bort,
25 Kan. 308, 37 Am. Rep. 255 (1881); Ex Parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936
(1920); People ex rel. Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 33 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Wicks
v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876 (1948).
5. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); See Butler v. Butler, 83
N.H. 413, 143 Ati. 471 (1928).
6. People ex rel. Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, supra note 4.
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domicile has been met.7 Temporary custody may be awarded as a measure
for the protection of the child,8 but only the court of the child's domiciliary
can change his status9 by an award of permanent custody. It is reasoned
that since the domiciliary state has better access to all the parties to the
original action, and greater knowledge of the entire case l this requirement
leads to a more convenient, orderly administration of justice.1
Although both views agree that the child's welfare is the primary and
only consideration, 12 the reasoning by which this objective is accomplished
differs. Courts holding to the residence-in-fact view reason that the mis-
conduct of the parents in their attempts to avoid the effects of the orig-
inal decree is not a factor to be considered and hence should not be visited
upon the child. 3 The courts following the domicile rule say that allowing
relitigation of the custody question rewards contempt,14 places a premium
on abduction, and hence does not promote the best interests of the child."
In those cases holding to the residence-in-fact rule the doctrine of
comity'" has been summarily dispensed with as a factor in deciding whether
jurisdiction should be involved.17 The principle of comity must be sub-
ordinated to the rights of the ward within the jurisdiction.' 8 Cases holding
to the domicile rule either imply the doctrine or state positively that comity
will not permit the modification of a sister state's decree.19
By assuming jurisdiction in the instant case, the court aligned itself
with those cases holding to the residence rule.20 These holdings show a dis-
couraging lack of faith in the original domiciliary state's ability to cope with
the problem. Even though a person should not ordinarily benefit from his
7. McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 1P.2d 444 (1945); Wear v. Wear,
130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606 (1930); In re Ashley, 113 Ore. 43, 231 Pac. 153 (1934) (by
implication); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83, 289 Pac. 740 (1930); Peacock v.
Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 194 S.W.2d 551 (1946); Lanning v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310,
99 S.W. 542 (1907); Jones v. MeCloud, 19 Wash.Zd 314, 142 P.2d 397 (1943); RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws 149 (1934); Goodrich, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1921).
8. Jones v. McCloud, supra note 7.
9. See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 Law and Con-
temp. Prob. 819 (1944); MINoR, CONFLICT OF LAws 96 (1901).
10. Ex Parte Bums, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P.2d 1025 (1938).
11. Cf. Ex Parte Mullins, 26 Vash.2d 419, 174 P.2d 790, 804 (1946).
12. See note 41 L.R.A. (n.s.) 564 (1913).
13. People ex. rel. Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 27 P.2d 1038 (1933); Sheehy
v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 253, 186 At]. 1 (1936); Commonwealth ex. rel. MeTighe v. Lindsey,
156 Pa. Super. 560, 40 A.2d 881 (1945) (by implication); Langan v. Langan, supra
note 4.
14. Evans v. Keller, 35 N.M. 659, 6 P.2d 200 (1931).
15. Helton v. Crawley, 41 N.V.2d 60, 80 (Iowa 1950) (dissent).
16. DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 10 (5th ed. 1932). In speaking of comity, the
learned writer emphasizes the application of foreign law is not a matter of caprice or
option; it does not arise from the desire of (a) ... sovereign to show courtesy to other
states. It flows from the impossibility of otherwise determining whole classes of cases
without gross inconvenience and injustice to litigants.
17. In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876 (1888); Finlay v. Finlay. supra
note 5; De La Montanya v. De La Montanya 12 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896).
18. llanrahn v. Sears, 72 N.H. 71, 54 At. 702 (1903).
19. Chapman v. Walker, supra note 7; Ex Parte Burns, supra note 10.
20. See note 4 supra.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
own wrong doing, the fact remains that parents have consistently violated
custody decrees and been awarded relief in jurisdictions where they have
brought the child. As more disappointed parents scurry across state lines
with the child that was lawfully awarded to the other parent, the courts
would do well, one writer has stated,"t to examine this maligned doctrine
of comity.
Since all agree that the child's welfare is the controlling consideration,
theoretically all courts, using that as a basis for decision, would render the
same finding in any given factual situation. Why not, then, require that a
parent appeal to the court of the child's domicile? The application of the
domicile rule operates to make the parent do so and thus has the particular
advantage of tending to prevent such acts as were committed by the mother
in the, instant case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURISDICTION -OVER FOREIGN
APPOINTED EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
Plaintiff, a New York resident, was seriously injured in an automobile
collision that took place on a New York highway. Deceased, the other par-
ticipant in the accident and a resident of Indiana, died as a result of the ac-
cident before plaintiff brought suit. After serving process as provided in a
New York statute,' the plaintiff brought suit naming the administrator of
the decedent's estate as defendant. The defendant was appointed in Indi-
ana, all of the estate assets were in Indiana, and he had given no actual
consent to jurisdiction by the New York courts. Held, for plaintiff on a
certified question of jurisdiction. By statute, the consent of a non-resident
user of state highways to jurisdiction is binding on the foreign-appointed
administrator of his estate. Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d
877 (1950).
The rendering of a judgment without jurisdiction over the parties is a
denial of "due process."2 But if there is a statute that provides for service
of process on an officer of the state as agent for non-resident users of state
highways, service inder the stattite (with proper notice) 3 will give the court
jurisdiction over the parties. 4 Such a statute does not allow the substitution
of executors of the decedent's estate where the decedent died either before
or after service of process on the state officer.5 However, it has been hinted
21. See note 9 supra.
1. N.Y. VEHICLE AND rRAFic LAw § 52, a statute allowing service of process on
the Secretary of State as agent for a non-resident user of state highways, and in case of
death as agent for the executors and administrators of the decedent's estate.
2. U.S. CONsT. AMEND. V.; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
4. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
5. Warner v. Maddox, 68 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Va. 1946); Brogan v. Macklin, 126
Con. 92, 9 A.2d 499 (1939); Dowling v. Winters, 208 N.C. 521, 181 S.E. 751 (1935);
